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Abstract—We present coding methods for protecting against
tampering of write-once optical disks, which turns them into a secure
digital medium for applications where critical information must be
stored in a way that prevents or allows detection of an attempt at
falsification. Our method involves adding a small amount of
redundancy to a modulated sector of data. This extra redundancy is
not used for normal operation, but can be used for determining, say, as
a testimony in court, that a disk has not been tampered with.
Index Terms—Optical disks, (d, k) codes, write-once memory, data
integrity, tampering.
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1 INTRODUCTION
IN documents to be presented in court, it is essential that the integ-
rity of the document can be guaranteed without a doubt. To this
end, techniques like digital signatures [12], [15], [16], [18] are used.
Although these techniques have been long established as able to
provide adequate protection, it cannot be assured that an attacker
having a great amount of time (like several years) cannot break the
system. Moreover, the decryption involves knowledge of a key. It
is conceivable that an attacker may gain physical possession of the
key, in which case the best cryptographic techniques are useless.
The purpose of this paper is to present an efficient method for
detecting possible tampering of optical disks while requiring a rela-
tively small addition of redundant information. The method also
tolerates a number of random errors, thus eliminating situations of
false alarms. Moreover, this technique does not involve use of cryp-
tography, but of the particular physics of the writing process. One
advantage over cryptography is that, in our method, there is no key
to break, and the security of the system is invariant with time.
Optical disks contain several layers of protection that ensure
the integrity of the data. The data is protected by ECC and CRC
codes [8] for correction and detection of errors, respectively. The
attacker may attempt to rewrite this data. However, if a write-once
recording media is used, the attacker cannot erase any written
data. This is because write-once optical media use recording
mechanisms that leave an irreversible materials change. They are,
therefore, a good starting point for secure digital media. What is
needed are additional coding approaches that prevent information
tampering via formation of additional marks or adding to the
length of already written marks. The particular physics of the
write process, in which the laser marks correspond to 1s that can-
not be erased, provide an opportunity to create a very simple
digital signature that will guarantee, with total certitude, that the
optical disk has not been altered.
This problem was first studied in [11]. There, the author proposes
the use of unordered codes (like, for instance, constant weight codes)
to detect hostile tampering. There are two problems with this ap-
proach that seriously undermine its value in practical applications:
The first problem is that it assumes unconstrained data at the en-
coding, ignoring the particular modulation codes used in optical
recording, like (1, 7) or (2, 7) codes [10]. The second problem is that
the normal noise existing in the system, like scratches, corrosion, soft
errors, etc., cannot be distinguished from hostile tampering of the
data. We will present a realistic method that overcomes these two
problems. In particular, our method is based on the concept of
EC/AUED (Error Correcting/All Unidirectional Error Detecting)
codes [2], [5], [6], [7] and has the following features:
1) It can be used with modulated data. In fact, the preferred
embodiment that we describe is for data modulated using a
(1, 7) code.
2) It can be tuned to operate in the presence of a prescribed
number of errors. Namely, false alarms caused by normal
noise can be eliminated.
3) The representation of the data is not altered by our method.
Only a small amount of redundant information is added to
secure the data.
4) The method does not affect the read operation. The redun-
dant information is accessed only while performing the veri-
fication procedure.
5) The encoding and verification procedures are easy to
implement.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section describes
modulation techniques used in write-once optical disks and a sim-
ple method that takes into account the modulation codes but
might generate false alarms due to noise in the reading process. In
Section 3, we present a general method that can tolerate any num-
ber of errors appearing as normal noise and, at the same time, can
detect hostile tampering.
2 TAMPERING IN A NOISELESS ENVIRONMENT
A key aspect of providing security by unambiguous detection of
tampering is to use a recording technology in which information is
written in a permanent manner. Data storage media which are eras-
able, such as magnetic storage or erasable optical storage, either
phase change or magneto-optic, are not suitable for this security
application, since information could be tampered with or changed
without leaving evidence that changes had been made. Fortunately,
there are nonerasable versions of data storage media which readily
lend themselves to implementing a scheme to detect tampering. A
common type is write-once optical storage media, which comes in
the form of disks, cards, and tape [17]. These are media in which
data can only be written once and cannot be erased once it is written.
Write-once optical storage media typically consists of a light
absorbing thin film recording layer deposited on a substrate.
Marks are formed at specific spatial locations of the recording
layer, as dictated by the data encoding pattern, when a sufficiently
intense focused laser beam is incident upon the recording layer.
Heating of this layer causes an irreversible transformation to occur
locally in the region of the focused beam. These permanent trans-
formations include, but are not limited to:
1) amorphous to crystalline phase change [13],
2) chemical reactions, such as decomposition of dyes [19]
which are used in CDR media, and
3) forming permanent holes by ablation [9].
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Each of these transformations causes a localized change of reflec-
tivity, which is detected to indicate the presence of a mark. Since
the transformations are irreversible, there is no way to undo or
erase the written data. However, it would be possible to go back to
the previously written mark and make it longer or make a new
mark in between two previously written marks.
Marks can be recorded on an optical disk in a number of ways.
The two most common are pulse position modulation (PPM) and
pulse width modulation (PWM). PPM recorded data uses marks of
only one type which are essentially circular in shape. Information
is encoded by the presence or absence of the mark. In the case of
(2, 7) [10] encoded data, the readback signal from the circular mark
would be approximately three channel clocks long. Each written
mark would be separated from the next circular mark by a space
which could be from three to eight channel clocks long. PWM re-
cording actually encodes information on both the leading and
trailing edges of the written mark, which yields a substantially
higher linear density than PPM for the same minimum mark size.
In the case of (1, 7) encoded PWM data, the minimum mark size
would be two channel clocks long. This mark would be essentially
circular in shape. Longer marks can also be formed, up to a maxi-
mum of eight channel clocks for this code. Following each mark,
there is a space. The minimum space is two channel clocks long
and the maximum space is eight channel clocks long. It is in the
spaces between the marks, regardless of whether it is PPM or
PWM encoded data, that an attacker could potentially add another
mark which would change the encoded data.
In the rest of the paper, we will concentrate essentially on the
PPM writing and then explain how to extend the results to PWM.
We will assume that each mark is a 1, while the absence of a mark
is a 0. In general, the most common modulation codes are the so-
called (d, k) constrained codes [10]. Namely, each pair of consecu-
tive 1s is separated by, at least, d 0s and by, at most, k 0s. The at-
tacker cannot erase the marks (i.e., the 1s), but can make marks as
he pleases on the 0s. For instance, the compact disk uses a (2, 10)
modulation code [10] and future products envision the use of a (1, 7)
modulation code [1]. Although, in this paper, we will focus on (d, k)
modulation codes, our techniques can be easily extended to ad-
dress other modulation schemes.
We propose adding an extra string (that we call a tail) at the end of
the data sector such that the writing of extra marks will be detected.
Note that the tail does not need to be physically located at the end of
the sector, but can be anywhere in the disk. The idea in this section is
to create an unordered code similar to the Berger construction [4]. The
difference between our construction and the Berger construction is
that we need to take into account the (d, k) constraints.
Let us describe the method before giving an example and for-
malizing it. Assume that we encode M bits of data into N bits us-
ing a (d, k) constrained code. Let n be the number of 1s in this
modulated string. Notice that the minimum value of n occurs only
when we have runs of k 0s followed by a 1, and there can only be
N/(k + 1) such runs. Explicitly, this string has the form










On the other hand, the maximum value of n occurs when we have
have runs of d 0s followed by a 1, and there can only be N/(d + 1)
runs. Explicitly, this string has the form










Therefore, we have to represent (N/(d + 1)) - (N/(k + 1)) + 1 possi-
ble numbers while following the roles of the modulation.










We call this code S(2, 4). Note that the code is systematic, since the
second and the fourth coordinates represent the information bits.
For example, the string 00101011 will be encoded using S(2, 4)
to the string 0010010001000101. Observe that the code S(2, 4) is
actually a (1, 5) modulation code. We note here that S(2, 4) can be
made a (1, 3) modulation code by varying the first bit between 0
and 1. Next we present the encoding algorithm.
Algorithm 2.1 (Modulated-Berger Encoding Algorithm)
Let n be the number of 1s in the modulated sector. Then the tail
(the redundant bits) is the complement of the number n - (N/(k + 1))
modulated using the code S(2, 4). Note that, in case the data and
the tail are adjacent on the disk, we might need to add at most d
merging bits to connect between the data and the tail while com-
plying with the (d, k) constraints.
EXAMPLE 2.1. Assume that we want to encode (1, 7)-constrained
sequences of length 32. The minimum number of 1s is four,
which occurs when the sequence
00000001000000010000000100000001
is received, while the maximum number of 1s is 16, which
occurs when the sequence
01010101010101010101010101010101
is received. Therefore, we need to represent 16 - 4 + 1 = 13
different values, which can be represented by a 4-bit binary
vector. Namely, encoding this 4-bit binary vector using S(2, 4),
we need 8 bits.
Assume that the following (1, 7) sequence of length 32
has been written:
00101000101010000001000100100010.
Counting the number of 1s, we obtain n = 9. Then, we have
to write the complement of 9 - 4 = 5. The number 5 is 0101
and its complement is 1010.
The encoding then gives the following sequence
00101000101010000001000100100010  0100  0100.
Now, assume that an attacker tries to tamper the data and
writes 1s in places that were 0s. Moreover, the receiver gets
the following sequence:
00101010101010101001010100101010  0100  0100.
When the disk is examined, we count 14 1s. That corre-
sponds to 14 - 4 = 10, which is 1010. The complement is
0101 and the encoding of the tail is: 0001  0001. We see that it
differs from 0100  0100, which is the tail stored in the disk,
so tampering is suspected. There is no way that the attacker
may tamper the data in such a way that tail 0100  0100 be-
comes tail 0001  0001 (he would need to erase 1s to do so).
The tail does not need to be appended to the end of the sector,
but can be written in a dedicated part of the disk. In normal read
operation, the security tail is ignored. However, when checking
data from the disk for possible tampering, all we have to do is
recompute the tail using Algorithm 2.1 and compare it with the
tail already stored in the disk: If the two coincide, then no tam-
pering is declared. Otherwise, tampering is suspected. The next
theorem states that this is the case.
THEOREM 2.1. Assume that an attacker tampers data written using Al-
gorithm 2.1. Then, the tampering will be detected, i.e., the tail
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computed by using the tampered data will not coincide with the
tail written in the disk.
PROOF. Our construction is combining between the Berger con-
struction of systematic unordered codes [4] and the modula-
tion using S(2, 4). Notice that the attacker can only increase
the number n of 1s in the data and in the tail when he tam-
pers with the information. Assume that the attacker in-
creases the number of 1s in the information part. Since the
number of 1s in the tail is a nonincreasing function on the
number of 1s in the information part, then the attacker
should be able to erase marks in the tail in order to create an
appropriate tail, which is impossible in the context of this
problem. 
Next we consider an example more related to actual applications.
EXAMPLE 2.2. Consider a 1,024-byte sector, each byte consisting of
8 bits. This gives a total of 8,192 bits. When modulated into a
rate 2/3 (1, 7) code, we obtain a total of (3/2)8,192 = 12,288
bits. The next step is counting the number n of 1s in this
modulated string. Notice that the minimum value of n oc-
curs only when we have runs of seven 0s followed by a 1,
and there can only be 12,288/8 = 1,536 runs. Explicitly, this






On the other hand, the maximum value of n occurs when
we have the run 01 repeated 12,288/2 = 6,144 times. Explic-






Therefore, we have to represent 6,144 - 1,536 + 1 = 4,609
possible numbers.
In order to represent 4,609 numbers, we need 13 bits.
Namely, using Algorithm 2.1, we need a sequence of length
26 bits. If we add a merging bit, the total length of the tail is
27 bits.
The approach presented above is not the most efficient in terms
of the amount of redundancy. However, it is very easy to imple-
ment. Next, we present an optimized way of representing the tail,
using a look-up-table encoding of the bit strings to (d, k) modu-
lated strings.
In order to represent these (N/(d + 1)) - (N/(k + 1)) + 1 num-
bers, we follow the method of Beenker and Immink [3]. The
method of Beenker and Immink consists of finding an m such that
there are (N/(d + 1)) - (N/(k + 1)) + 1 (d, k) sequences of length m,
starting with, at most, k - 1 0s and ending with, at most, k - 1 0s.
Preferably, we will choose m minimal with these properties. In
addition, d merging bits that avoid violation of the (d, k) con-
straints are added at the beginning of the string, giving a total of
m + d bits for the tail.
Next, we order these sequences in nonincreasing weight order.
Let us call T the ((N/(d + 1)) - (N/(k + 1)) + 1) · m matrix whose
rows are the sequences described above, and denote by ti the ith
row of T, 1 £ i £ (N/(d + 1)) - (N/(k + 1)) + 1. Therefore, if i < j,
then wH(ti) ‡ wH(tj), where wH(ti) denotes the Hamming weight of
ti. Having defined the matrix T, we add an (m + d)-bit tail to the
sector by using the following algorithm:
Algorithm 2.2 (Look-Up-Table Encoding Algorithm)
Let n be the number of 1s in the modulated sector. Then, add d
merging bits followed by the vector of length m tn-(N/(k+1))+1. The
merging bits are obtained according to the method in [3].
Notice that, for an increasing value of n, the number of 1s in the
tail as given by Algorithm 2.2 is nonincreasing.
EXAMPLE 2.3. Assume that we want to encode (1, 7)-constrained
sequences of length 32. The minimum number of 1s is four,
which occurs when the sequence
00000001000000010000000100000001
is received, while the maximum number of 1s is 16, which
occurs when the sequence
01010101010101010101010101010101
is received. Therefore, we need 16 - 4 + 1 = 13 (1, 7) se-
quences. For instance, the following 13 · 6 matrix provides











































Assume that the following (1, 7) sequence of length 32
has been written:
00101000101010000001000100100010.
Counting the number of 1s, we obtain n = 9. Then, we have
to append the merging bit followed by row 9 - 3 = 6 of ma-
trix B, which is
010010.
The encoding then gives the following sequence
00101000101010000001000100100010  1  010010.
Now, assume that an attacker tries to tamper with the
data and writes 1s in places that were 0s. Moreover, the re-
ceiver gets the following sequence:
00101010101010101001010100101010  1  010010.
When the disk is examined, we count 14 1s. That corre-
sponds to row 14 - 3 = 11 of B, which is
101000.
We see that it differs from 010010, which is the tail stored in
the disk, so tampering is suspected. There is no way that the
attacker may tamper the data in such a way that tail 010010
becomes tail 101000 (he would need to erase 1s to do so).
Consider, as in Example 2.2, the 1,024-byte sector, each byte
consisting of 8 bits. The method of Beenker and Immink in this
case consists of considering all the (1, 7) sequences of length 18,
starting with, at most, six 0s and ending with, at most, six 0s. In
addition, a merging bit that avoids violation of the (1, 7) con-
straints is added at the beginning of the string, giving a total of 19
bits. There are more than 4,609 sequences using the method de-
scribed above. We can order these sequences in nonincreasing
number of 1s as follows: Consider the first nine sequences of
weight 7 in alphabetical order, then all the sequences of weight 6
in alphabetical order (there are exactly 1,709 of them), then the
1,876 sequences of weight 5, and, finally, the 1,015 sequences of
weight 4, giving a total of 4,609 sequences. Let T be the 4,609 · 18
matrix whose rows are the sequences described above, and let ti be
the ith row of T, 1 £ i £ 4,609. Then, we add a 19-bit tail to the sector
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by using Algorithm 2.1. In this particular case, the merging bit is 1 if
the preceding and the following bits are 0, and it is 0 otherwise.
In summary, we have a trade-off between the two methods.
The first method provides efficient encoding/decoding. However,
it produces longer tails. The second method requires large look-
up-tables for encoding/decoding but produces shorter tails.
3 TAMPERING IN A NOISY ENVIRONMENT
Errors like natural scratches, corrosion, soft errors, etc., may create
a mismatch between the read sector and the tail in the process
described in Section 2. If the disks are stored during a long period
of time, then it is very likely that, in many cases, the evidence will
be dismissed as unreliable when the underlying error-correcting
code can perfectly take care of the noise. Thus, it is desirable to
device a method that allows us to distinguish between natural
noise and a real possibility of data tampering.
We next give a new algorithm that allows for a certain number
of errors, say t1, in the information part, and t2 errors in the tail. As
in Section 2, we assume that there is a systematic encoder that
encodes a vector into a (d, k)-constrained code. For instance, for d = 1,
we have S(2, 4), which is a (1, 5) code of rate 2/4. Normally, the
rate of a systematic (d, k)-constrained code is worse than the rate of
a (d, k) code without the restriction that it must be systematic.
However, this is not critical since we are going to encode into a
systematic (d, k) code only a very short vector.
There is another concept that we need to introduce in order to
describe the Encoding Algorithm. It is the concept of a t-error-
correcting/all unidirectional error-detecting (EC/AUED) code [2],
[5], [6], [7]. In order to define a t-EC/AUED code, we need some
notation. Let u and v be binary vectors of the same length. Then,
N(u, v) denotes the number of coordinates where u is 1 and v is 0.
For example, N(1101, 0110) = 2 and N(0110, 1101) = 1. Notice that
N(u, v) + N(v, u) = dH(u, v), where dH denotes Hamming distance.
We say that a binary code & is t-EC/AUED if, given any or-
dered pair u and v ˛ &, then N(u, v) ‡ t + 1. For example, let
& = {001110,  110010,  011001}.
We can easily verify that N(u, v) ‡ 2 for any u, v ˛ &, therefore, & is
1-EC/AUED. Describing efficient constructions as well as encod-
ing and decoding algorithms of t-EC/AUED codes is beyond the
scope of this paper, so, again, we refer the reader to [2], [5], [6], [7].
We say that a binary vector has suffered unidirectional errors if
all the errors in the vector are either of type 0 fi 1 or 1 fi 0. For
instance, assume that the binary vector 01010 has been transmit-
ted, but the binary vector 01111 has been received. Then, both the
third and the fifth bits have suffered unidirectional errors of
type 0 fi 1. Similarly, if the binary vector 00000 has been received,
then the second and fourth bits have suffered unidirectional errors
of type 1 fi 0. On the other hand, if 10010 has been received, then
vector 01010 has suffered a 0 fi 1 error in its first bit, and a 1 fi 0
error in its second bit. Certainly, 01010 has not suffered unidirec-
tional errors in this case.
The main property of a t-EC/AUED code is the following: It can
correct up to t random errors and detect any number of unidirec-
tional errors when this number exceeds t. Next, we will show how to
use this property of t-EC/AUED codes to detect tampering.
Let t1 be the number of errors that we are willing to tolerate in
the information part and t2 the number of errors in the tail. Nor-
mally, t1 is much larger than t2 and is related to the number of
errors that the underlying ECC can handle. In other words, t1 is
related to the normal noise of the system, and we want to avoid
that this noise will make us suspect that tampering has occurred,
as would be the case if we used the method described in the previ-
ous section. Next, we describe an encoding method to produce a
tail that is resistant to normal noise. Interestingly, t1 will have no
role in the encoding, and can be determined, varied, or made
adaptive, according to the system. We use the notation of the pre-
vious section where relevant.
Algorithm 3.1 (EC/AUED Encoding Algorithm)
Let n be the number of 1s in an N-bit (d, k)-constrained sector. Then:
1) Let u be the Ølog2((N/(d + 1)) - (N/(k + 1)) + 1)ø-bit vector
representing n in binary.
2) Let v be the encoding of u into a t2-EC/AUED code [6].
3) Let t be a systematic encoding of v into a (d, k)-constrained code.
Then, t is the tail vector appended to the sector (possibly with d
merging bits).
The parameter t1 a priori determined is utilized during the veri-
fication algorithm to be presented next.
Algorithm 3.2 (Verification Algorithm)
Assume that (s, t) is received, where s represents the sector and t
represents the tail. Let n be the number of 1s in s. Then:
1) Demodulate t to obtain the vector v.
2) Decode v for t2 errors. If no decoding is obtained, then tam-
pering is suspected. Otherwise, let u be the information bits
corresponding to the decoding of v.
3) Let m be the number represented by the binary vector u. If
|n - m| £ t1, then accept the sector. Otherwise, tampering is
suspected.
The next theorem proves that the method is 100 percent effi-
cient against tampering, while it can be tuned to operate in the
presence of a prescribed number of errors. Namely, false alarms
caused by normal noise can be eliminated.
THEOREM 3.1. Tampering will be detected by Algorithm 3.1 iff the com-
bination of normal noise and tampering results in either > t1
marks in the information part or > t2 marks in the tail. Otherwise,
the tampering will be corrected.
PROOF. Assume first that the attacker made > t2 marks in the tail,
and, without loss of generality, assume that those marks af-
fect the systematic part of the tail only. In particular, since
he can only make 1s, this is equivalent to creating > t2 unidi-
rectional errors, which will be detected by the code and
tampering is suspected.
Assume now that the attacker makes > t1 marks in the in-
formation part and £ t2 marks in the tail. Then, the number
m represented by u is correctly obtained. However, n, the
number of 1s in s, is greater than m and n - m > t1, thus,
tampering is suspected.
Note that, if the attacker makes £ t2 marks in the tail,
these marks will be corrected by the t2-EC/AUED code. If
he makes £ t1 marks in the information part, we are detect-
ing this fact, but we are trusting the correction of errors to
the ECC, which we a priori know. 
The next example illustrates Algorithms 3.1 and 3.2.
EXAMPLE 3.1. Consider the situation of Example 2.1. Assume that
we fix t1 = 2 and t2 = 1. To write the weights, we needed 13
numbers, therefore, 4 bits. These 4 bits can be encoded into a
1-EC/AUED code of length 11 as described in [6].
As in Example 2.1, assume that the following (1, 7) se-
quence of length 32 has been written:
00101000101010000001000100100010.
Next, we obtain the tail t according to Encoding Algo-
rithm 3.1.
The number of 1s is n = 9. The binary representation of 9
is u = 1001. Using the [7, 4, 3] Hamming code with parity-
check matrix








1 1 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 1
u is encoded as u¢ = 1001001. Using the descending tail ma-
trix [6]
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
vector u¢, which has weight 3, is encoded as v = 10010011010.
Finally, we modulate v using the (1, 5) rate 1/2 code. Since v





The remaining 10 bits are modulated in pairs in the usual
way. Therefore, v is modulated as
t = 0100100100000101000100.
Finally, by adding a merging bit, as described in the pre-
vious section, the final encoded information with tail is then
00101000101010000001000100100010  1  0100100100000101000100.
As before, assume that an attacker tries to tamper the
data by writing 1s in places that were 0s. We will now use
Verification Algorithm 3.2. Assume that the receiver gets the
following sequence:
00101000101010010001010100100010  1  0100100101000101000100.
The first step is demodulating the tail. Doing so, we obtain
the vector 10011011010. Consider the first 7 bits corre-
sponding to the [7, 4] Hamming code, i.e., 1001101. The de-
coding of this vector gives 1001001 (one error in the fifth
bit). Recomputing the last 4 bits, we obtain 1010, which cor-
responds to the received vector. Therefore, the tail is ac-
cepted, and the information part is 1001, which corresponds
to the number 9. Now, counting the number of 1s in the in-
formation part, we see that this number is 11. Since 11 - 9 = 2
and t1 = 2, we accept the information.
On the other hand, assume that the receiver gets
00101000101010010101010100101010  1  0100100101000101000100.
In this case, the tail is the same as before, so it is accepted.
The information part has now 13 1s, and 13 - 9 = 4 > 2, so
tampering is suspected.
Now, let us consider a more realistic situation, as at the end of
Section 2. Consider a 1,024-byte sector, each byte consisting of 8
bits. Thus, we need a 13-bit binary vector u to represent the num-
ber of 1s in a (1, 7)-constrained sector. Assume that we fix t2 = 4. In
Algorithm 3.1, vector u has to be encoded into a 4-EC/AUED
code. Following the methods in [7] or [6], u can be encoded into a
4-EC/AUED code of length 38. Using the (1, 5) systematic modu-
lation code of rate 1/2, we obtain a tail t of length 76. We can also
append a merging bit between the tail and the sector to prevent a
violation of the (1, 7)-constraint. The parameter t1 may be arbitrar-
ily determined according to the specifications of the product. Let
us also point out that, if we know a priori that the errors are al-
ways of unidirectional type, then, instead of using t-EC/AUED
codes, we can use t-unidirectional error-correcting all unidirec-
tional error detecting (UC/AUED) codes. There are UC/AUED
codes that are more efficient than their EC/AUED counterparts [2].
The method can be adapted to PWM type of writing with little
modifications. In a PWM setup, marks have different lengths, cor-
responding to strings of 1s. Now, a tamperer has two possible
strategies: One is increasing the length of a mark (i.e., to a string of
1s), and another one is writing new marks between old marks. In
either case, the total number of 1s increases by this action of the
tamperer. This allows us to use Berger codes to write down the
number of 0s (i.e., the total space between the marks). The tam-
perer can only decrease the number of 0s, allowing for easy detec-
tion using the Berger method. The method can be adapted for dif-
ferent runlengths of symbols.
4 CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a method that can be used to detect possible
tampering of Write-Once storage media. The method concentrates
on preventing the rewriting of a disk. It is very general and pro-
vides total protection against tampering.
The paper has focused on implementing the security scheme in
write-once optical disks. However, the concept is readily general-
ized to other two-dimensional, planar-based, write-once recording
technologies, such as optical tape or AFM probe storage. In addi-
tion, the concept can be generalized to three-dimensional write-
once storage media, such as multilayer [14] or holographic storage.
In this case, a sector might be three-dimensional in nature, but the
same methodology of counting the number of recorded user bits
and encoding that number would still apply. In addition, this con-
cept is readily extendible to any other type of permanent recording
technology, such as programmable read-only memories (PROM),
which may be implemented in smart cards.
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